收益
公司治理
业务
环境治理
会计
盈余质量
波动性(金融)
财务
增加物
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.eiar.2023.107299
摘要
The dampening impact of analysts' earnings pressure on corporate environmental performance has gradually attracted attention. Environmental judicial specialization may be an effect way to alleviate managers' earnings obsession and impel corporate environmental governance in emerging economies. Using a panel data of listed companies in China, this study mainly explores the impact of analysts' earnings pressure on corporate environmental governance and the moderating role of environmental courts on this effect from the perspective of environmental judicial specialization. We discover that: (1) the rise of analysts' earnings pressure will urge managers to cut environmental governance investment, and this effect is more prominent for firms with higher profits volatility, higher stock turnover, and lower analyst coverage; (2) environmental courts weaken the detriment of analysts' earnings pressure on corporate environmental investment; (3) the moderating role of environmental courts is especially prominent in firms with higher economic contribution and firms subjected to weaker environmental regulatory intensity. Furthermore, the establishment of environmental courts mitigates the detriment of analysts' earnings pressure on non-financial environmental disclosure. Our findings have great significance for firms plagued by earnings pressure and regulators involved in ecological governance.
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