Accountable for What? The Effect of Accountability Standard Specification on Decision-Making Behavior in the Public Sector

This study investigates how civil servants’ decision-making behavior is affected by what they are held accountable for. We look into the effects of specification of the accountability standard, and analyze the behavioral changes that might arise by holding civil servants accountable for the implementation of specific rules, as opposed to more loosely defined standards, or no predefined standards at all. Drawing on existing debates in public administration, as well as on theoretical accounts from social psychology, we develop two hypotheses outlining advantages and drawbacks of moving to either side of the accountability standard specification continuum. Specifically, we hypothesize a tradeoff between decision-making effort and decision impartiality. We perform our investigation using an online vignette and a classroom experiment. The results from the investigation do not offer clear support for our expectations. The hypothesis suggesting that accountability for general standards has positive effects on decision processes in terms of effort receives some tentative support, while the one linking specific standards to decision impartiality does not. We discuss possible reasons for this outcome, and draw recommendations for further research aiming to integrate psychological insights into public accountability research.