不当行为
激励
衡平法
业务
会计
经济
政治学
微观经济学
法学
作者
Justin Chircop,Monika Tarsalewska,Agnieszka Trzeciakiewicz
标识
DOI:10.2308/tar-2020-0648
摘要
ABSTRACT We examine the relation between CEO risk taking equity incentives, as captured by CEO vega, and workplace misconduct. Workplace misconduct includes health and safety violations, non-compliance with labor laws, and other violations broadly related to labor exploitation, and it results in significant economic costs. Using regression analysis, matched sample tests, and a quasi-natural experiment, we find a positive relation between CEO vega and workplace misconduct. We identify a reduction in discretionary expenses and increased employee workload as channels through which CEO vega affects workplace misconduct. JEL Classifications: G30; G32; G34.
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