Lonely Leadership: The Influence of Single-Child CEOs on Corporate Innovation and Culture

Abstract This paper explores the influence of single-child CEOs on corporate innovation and culture within the context of China’s one-child policy. Utilizing multiple identification strategies, we find that firms led by single-child CEOs invest significantly less in innovation and generate fewer and lower-impact patents. Examining the underlying economic mechanisms, we find that these CEOs foster a corporate culture that discourages trust and collaboration, leading to increased inventor departures. Additionally, firms under their leadership exhibit lower idiosyncratic risk, aligning with the typically cautious behavior of only children. Our analysis demonstrates that these outcomes are primarily driven by behavioral traits associated with being an only child, including self-centeredness, reduced team orientation, and heightened risk aversion. Overall, the study sheds light on how the singular upbringing of single-child CEOs shapes corporate behavior and performance, revealing the broader, enduring economic consequences of national population policies.