Do Interactions Between Investors and Management Result in More Conservative Accounting Information?*

Abstract Within the context of the investor–management interaction platforms “E‐Interaction” and “Interaction Easy,” this paper investigates the influence of investor and management interaction on accounting conservatism and explores the strategic response behavior of management. The findings indicate that both the intensity and depth of investor inquiries contribute to the enhancement of accounting conservatism. Moreover, compared to “template” responses, management's “targeted” responses to investors significantly increase the accounting conservatism of companies. Mechanism tests reveal that investor–management interaction, by enhancing investor monitoring capabilities and increasing the litigation and reputational risks faced by companies, subsequently enhances the accounting conservatism of companies. Further analysis shows that in cases where companies are audited by non‐Big Four auditor and have lower analyst coverage, indicating a weaker external information environment, investor–management interaction can yield better governance effects.