Recognition and Justice

In this article, Axel Honneth outlines a plural theory of justice. In developing his argument he takes his departure not in the classic elimination of ‘inequality’, but in the avoidance of ‘humiliation’ or ‘disrespect’. He is convinced that an appropriate point of departure for a recognition-theoretical conception of justice must show that the experience of social injustice is always measured in terms of the withholding of some recognition held to be legitimate. Throughout the article, Honneth makes strong reservations about Nancy Fraser’s approach, where ‘recognition’ and ‘redistribution’ are separated into two conceptual totalities with the single goal of ‘participatory equality’. On the contrary, he suggests having a more elaborate concept of identity formation, so that participating in the public realm means participating without shame, capable of unfurling his or her own personality’s potential in an unforced manner and of thus developing a personal identity. From this standpoint Honneth points to three differentiated spheres of recognition that must be obtained if the individual is to obtain a personal identity, namely love, equal treatment in law and social esteem.