业务
权力下放
产业组织
库存管理
供应链
对偶(语法数字)
单位(环理论)
分散系统
对策
微观经济学
营销
运营管理
控制(管理)
经济
数学教育
航空航天工程
艺术
数学
管理
工程类
文学类
市场经济
作者
Jin Li,Liao Yi,Victor Shi,Xiding Chen
出处
期刊:Omega
[Elsevier BV]
日期:2020-02-13
卷期号:98: 102213-102213
被引量:107
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.omega.2020.102213
摘要
There has been extensive research on supplier encroachment. That is, a supplier sells to consumers through a direct retail subsidiary in addition to an independent retailer. However, most research assumes centralized encroachment, where the supplier makes decisions for the subsidiary. In this research, we make a major contribution by explicitly analyzing the option of decentralized encroachment, where the subsidiary makes its own pricing and/or quantity decisions. Furthermore, we make another major contribution by studying the retailer's possible use of strategic inventory as a countermeasure to achieve wholesale price concessions from the supplier. In a dual channel consisting of a retailer and a supplier and its subsidiary in a two-period model, we find that when the retailer can employ strategic inventory, decentralized encroachment outperforms centralized encroachment for the supplier and the retailer. Moreover, if the supplier adopts the strategy of decentralized encroachment, the retailer's use of strategic inventory always benefits the supplier, but it benefits the retailer only when the unit inventory holding cost is below a threshold. We also conduct numerical examples to further illustrate our analytical findings and gain more managerial insights.
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