补贴
联盟
业务
政府(语言学)
过程(计算)
中国
绿色创新
产业组织
环境政策
环境经济学
营销
经济
计算机科学
哲学
法学
操作系统
语言学
市场经济
政治学
作者
Zhi Yang,Heng Chen,Lan Mi,Panpan Li,Kai Qi
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.scs.2021.103122
摘要
To expedite green building technologies (GBTs) adoption among construction enterprises, the Chinese government has launched a series of environmental policies that encourage the establishment of green building alliances. By building an evolutionary game optimization model, this study reveals the game strategy changes of multiple stakeholders and the impact of environmental policies on GBTs adoption among alliance-based construction enterprises. On this basis, the case study and simulation method are used to simulate the impact of implementation strength for environmental policies on the decision-making of stakeholders in alliances. The simulation results show that the strength of different environmental policies should reach a certain threshold (over 0.5). Comparatively speaking, the effect of green subsidy policies is usually superior to the impact of environmental tax policies; and the higher the ratio of market participants in the carbon emission trading, the better and more complete the GBTs adoption in alliances. Moreover, a single policy is more affected by the internal environment in alliances, but policy mixes can be most effective to promote GBTs adoption among construction enterprises. Therefore, the combination of environmental taxes, green subsidies and carbon trading will be the better policy instruments to develop GBTs in green building alliances.
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