收益
语调(文学)
知情人
内幕交易
业务
激励
公司治理
会计
货币经济学
经济
财务
微观经济学
政治学
文学类
艺术
法学
作者
Lin Cheng,Qinglu Jin,Hui Ma
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2023.102419
摘要
In this study, we examine whether emphasized tone in earnings releases systematically predict managers' insider trading activities in the post earnings releases periods and whether managers' choices of tone placement in earnings releases are motivated by opportunistic incentives. We find that, holding constant the net tone of the overall document, managers make more insider sales (purchases) immediately after earnings releases when positive (negative) tone is presented more prominently in the document. In addition, we document that the relation between tone emphasis and the observed insider trading activities is more (less) pronounced when insiders have greater information advantage or when a firm's overall information environment is more opaque (when a firm has better corporate governance). Overall, our findings suggest that managers use narrative characteristics strategically to facilitate their insider trading and achieve personal gains.
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