Evolutionary game of destination brand co‐construction with government involvement

Abstract To gain a competitive advantage in tourism, more and more regions are adopting destination branding as their necessary strategy, but destination branding is a quasi‐public good that is prone to market failure. It is very necessary to formulate appropriate incentive policies. To design appropriate incentives and optimise the mechanism of destination brand co‐construction, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model, considering local governments, tourist attractions operating enterprises and tourism service enterprises. The results show that brand co‐building cost has a negative impact and brand premium has a positive impact on tourism enterprise cooperation. The cooperation reward of local government has a positive impact, and the punishment of noncooperation has a positive impact on tourism enterprise cooperation, and the restraint effect of punishment measures is more significant. This paper discusses the incentives to promote destination brand co‐construction, which can provide enlightenment for policy formulation.