| 标题 |
Self-or Rival-Revelation? Dynamic Information Design in Sequential Competition
|
| 网址 |
求助人暂未提供
|
| DOI |
暂未提供，该求助的时间将会延长，查看原因？
|
| 其它 | 刘云川，部分摘要In uncertain environments, consumers seek and interpret information to reduce ambiguity and guide their choices and purchase decisions. In this paper, we study how firms strategically design information about either themselves or their rivals to influence consumer purchase decisions in dynamic competition. We construct a dynamic Bayesian persuasion model in which a leader firm and a follower firm sequentially design and send their information to consumers to strategically shape consumers' beliefs on the two firms' product match. Our analysis shows that, strikingly, the leader firm may choose to “serve” the competing rival firm with a high risk gambler strategy of fully providing the rival information to consumers, especially when consumers have moderate prior beliefs for the leader firm. |
| 求助人 | |
| 下载 |
PDF的下载单位、IP信息已删除
(2025-6-4)
cdercder
DW
无极微光
Nole
然宝
aaaa
学术文献互助
水煮电吹风
Kao
sagitar
秋风
单纯大侠
dde
xing_xing
v0id
随风沙ZYX
忧郁青亦
2052669099
adasd
aajhajkahna
皖公网安备34019202002308
