块链
供应链
业务
接种疫苗
关税
利润(经济学)
单位(环理论)
计算机科学
运营管理
营销
计算机安全
工程类
经济
医学
微观经济学
数学
数学教育
国际贸易
免疫学
作者
Ruihuan Liu,Chunqiao Tan,Desheng Wu,Chengwei Zhao
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.cie.2023.109346
摘要
Vaccine safety management is a top priority of vaccine supply chain (VSC) management. Faced with the increasingly serious vaccine safety problems, blockchain technology is regarded as an effective solution strategy. However, from the perspective of the supply chain operations and consumers, how to carry out blockchain construction is an issue that needs to be discussed. Considering the reality that vaccine manufacturers and vaccination units are implementing blockchain construction, we construct a VSC game model consisting of a vaccine manufacturer and a vaccination unit, analyze the conditions for applying blockchain technology in the VSC, and discuss who undertakes the blockchain construction between the vaccine manufacturer and the vaccination unit, which is more beneficial to the VSC and consumers. We further study the coordination of blockchain-based vaccine supply chain. The results show that, from the perspective of enterprises and consumers, blockchain technology will be adopted only when certain conditions are met. Compared with the vaccination unit, the blockchain construction undertaken by the vaccine manufacturer is more beneficial to the VSC and consumers. The vaccine manufacturer and the vaccination unit jointly undertake the blockchain construction, that is, sign a cost-sharing contract, which can improve the performance of the VSC, but cannot make the total profit reach the optimal level. When certain conditions are met, the two-part tariff contract can realize the blockchain-based VSC coordination.
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