远程医疗
收入
业务
软件部署
集合(抽象数据类型)
服务(商务)
人口
福利
医学
计算机科学
社会福利
运营管理
营销
经济
医疗保健
财务
市场经济
环境卫生
政治学
法学
程序设计语言
经济增长
操作系统
作者
Balaraman Rajan,Tolga Tezcan,Abraham Seidmann
出处
期刊:Management Science
[Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences]
日期:2018-05-08
卷期号:65 (3): 1236-1267
被引量:135
标识
DOI:10.1287/mnsc.2017.2979
摘要
Medical specialists treating chronic conditions typically face a heterogeneous set of patients. Such heterogeneity arises because of differences in medical conditions as well as the travel burden each patient faces to visit the clinic periodically. Given this heterogeneity, we compare the strategic behavior of revenue-maximizing and welfare-maximizing specialists and prove that the former will serve a smaller patient population, spend more time with the patients, and have shorter waiting times. We also analyze the impact of telemedicine technology on patient utility and the specialists’ operating decisions. We consider both the case when specialists can freely set their own fee for service and the case when fees are set exogenously by a third-party payer. We prove that with the introduction of telemedicine, the specialists become more productive and the overall social welfare increases, although some patients, unexpectedly, will be worse off. Our analytical results lead to some important policy implications for facilitating the further deployment of telemedicine in the care of chronically ill patients. This paper was accepted by Serguei Netessine, operations management.
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