互惠(文化人类学)
利他主义(生物学)
社会心理学
特质
公共物品
互惠利他主义
强互惠
心理学
互惠的
人口
助人行为
公共物品游戏
亲属选择
微观经济学
经济
博弈论
社会学
进化生物学
非合作博弈
生物
人口学
哲学
程序设计语言
语言学
计算机科学
作者
Herbert Gintis,Samuel Bowles,Robert Boyd,Ernst Fehr
标识
DOI:10.1016/s1090-5138(02)00157-5
摘要
Recent experimental research has revealed forms of human behavior involving interaction among unrelated individuals that have proven difficult to explain in terms of kin or reciprocal altruism. One such trait, strong reciprocity is a predisposition to cooperate with others and to punish those who violate the norms of cooperation, at personal cost, even when it is implausible to expect that these costs will be repaid. We present evidence supporting strong reciprocity as a schema for predicting and understanding altruism in humans. We show that under conditions plausibly characteristic of the early stages of human evolution, a small number of strong reciprocators could invade a population of self-regarding types, and strong reciprocity is an evolutionary stable strategy. Although most of the evidence we report is based on behavioral experiments, the same behaviors are regularly described in everyday life, for example, in wage setting by firms, tax compliance, and cooperation in the protection of local environmental public goods.
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