斯塔克伯格竞赛
信息共享
供应链
利润(经济学)
计算机科学
供求关系
利润分享
业务
独创性
微观经济学
营销
经济
万维网
财务
创造力
政治学
法学
作者
Xiaogang Cao,Jing Yuan,Hui Wen,Cuiwei Zhang
出处
期刊:Kybernetes
[Emerald Publishing Limited]
日期:2023-01-04
卷期号:53 (3): 1181-1207
被引量:1
标识
DOI:10.1108/k-06-2022-0848
摘要
Purpose Different information sharing mechanisms and online platform information sharing to different charging models are compared and analyzed. Design/methodology/approach This paper uses the Stackelberg game model to study the demand information sharing and pricing decisions. Findings The results show that: (1) the retailer's pricing strategy is the highest when both of them obtain information, while the manufacturer's pricing strategy is affected by the related attributes of different products, such as the sensitivity of consumers to product prices; (2) in the online platform sales model, the demand information data sharing owned by the online platform can bring more expected profits to the whole supply chain and the members of the supply chain, and the higher the accuracy of the information, the higher the expected profit; (3) when the cost of obtaining demand information is zero, that is, the online platform shares the information data about market demand free of charge, the retailer and manufacturer tend to obtain information; (4) for the online platform, charging a certain fee can achieve higher expected profits than free sharing. Originality/value Based on the single platform online sales model, this paper uses the Stackelberg game model to study the demand information sharing and pricing decision of a manufacturer and a retailer selling products through the same online platform.
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