绿色洗涤
偏爱
公司治理
惩罚(心理学)
风险厌恶(心理学)
业务
透视图(图形)
经济
产业组织
微观经济学
期望效用假设
企业社会责任
公共关系
心理学
社会心理学
政治学
财务
金融经济学
计算机科学
人工智能
作者
Changyu Liu,Wanrong Gong,Guanglong Dong,Qiang Ji
出处
期刊:Energy Economics
[Elsevier BV]
日期:2024-05-21
卷期号:135: 107637-107637
被引量:41
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.eneco.2024.107637
摘要
The greenwashing behaviors (GWBs) of enterprises have become the primary obstacle of environmental, social and governance (ESG) disclosure. This paper focuses on the collaborative regulation of GWBs in ESG disclosure; explores the interactive behavior among governments, enterprises, and investors; and presents the tripartite evolutionary game (Model I). We further analyze the stability strategy and key influence factors of each participant. Subsequently, considering enterprises' risk preference, the extended tripartite game model (Model II) is also investigated. Finally, we reveal evolutionarily stable strategies and conduct a sensitivity analysis using the simulation. The results demonstrate the following: 1) the initial strategy selection of participants is critical to the evolution of equilibrium strategies; 2) punishment combats GWBs more effectively than reward, with only moderate punishment and reward intensity being conducive to preventing greenwashing; and 3) when enterprises are risk aversion, strengthening regulation is more effective in preventing GWBs. This paper gives a new perspective for preventing greenwashing in ESG disclosure from the insights of collaborative regulation and provides policymakers significant references to improve ESG greenwashing governance.
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