期刊:Asian Survey [University of California Press] 日期:2025-03-01卷期号:65 (2): 202-213被引量:3
标识
DOI:10.1525/as.2025.65.2.202
摘要
In 2024 Pakistan was focused on four I’s: (a) military and civilian pressure on former Prime Minister Imran Khan and his party, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf; (b) a constitutional amendment, facilitated by Supreme Court Chief Justice Qazi Faez Isa, aiming to reduce judicial independence; (c) the successful pursuit of a fresh bailout from the IMF that helped to stem inflation; and (d) expanding insurgencies in both Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan—the former associated with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (Pakistan Taliban Movement); the latter, with the Balochistan National Army: both groups enjoyed cross-border support from Afghanistan and (alleged) covert support from India. To constrain the populism of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf and the autonomy of the superior courts, in a context characterized by critical economic and security challenges, government and military officials collaborated to shore up Pakistan’s civil–military (democratic–authoritarian) “hybrid regime.”