竞争法
损害赔偿
危害
法律与经济学
激励
竞赛(生物学)
相称性(法律)
背景(考古学)
业务
知识产权
产业组织
经济
法学
政治学
微观经济学
垄断
生态学
古生物学
生物
作者
Patrice Bougette,Oliver Budzinski,Frédéric Marty
标识
DOI:10.1177/0003603x221082757
摘要
Conceived as a theory of competitive harm, self-preferencing has been at the core of recent European landmark cases (e.g., Google Android, Google Shopping). In the context of EU competition law, beyond the anticompetitive leveraging effect, self-preferencing may lead to vertical and horizontal exclusionary abuses, encourage exploitation abuses, and generate economic dependence abuses. In this paper, we aim at characterizing the various forms of self-preferencing, investigating platforms’ capacity and incentives to do so through their dual role, by shedding light on the economic assessment of these practices in an effects-based approach. We analyze the different options for remedies in this context, by insisting on their necessity, adequacy, and proportionality.
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