Recycling of retired power batteries: A four-party evolutionary game considering consumer behavior preferences and informal recyclers’ participation

With the rapid expansion of the new energy vehicle market, retired power batteries from new energy vehicles have entered a stage of large-scale replacement, and their safe and environmentally sound recycling has attracted widespread attention. Drawing on behavioral economics and game theory, this paper incorporates consumer behavioral preferences and the market participation of informal recyclers to construct a four-party evolutionary game model involving the government, consumers, formal recyclers, and informal recyclers. Combined with simulation, this study explores how government policies, market prices, and consumer behavioral preferences—including irrational factors such as mental accounting, social norms, and loss aversion—affect the evolutionary dynamics of the recycling system. The results show that: Fines on informal recyclers have a stronger impact than subsidies for formal recyclers and exhibit a threshold effect: when fines are below 1200 yuan, their deterrent effect is limited; when fines exceed this level, informal recyclers oscillate between “cooperation” and “counteraction,” with higher fines causing greater strategic fluctuations. In addition, differences in recycling prices also show a threshold effect on consumers' choice of recycling channels: when the price difference between informal and formal recyclers does not exceed 200 yuan, consumers prefer formal recyclers; once it surpasses 200 yuan, they tend to turn to informal recyclers. Moreover, consumers’ loss aversion has a stronger influence on their strategies than environmental protection utility, guilt, or social norms. Specifically, environmental protection utility, guilt, and social norms can only slow the speed at which consumers shift to informal channels, but cannot alter their ultimate choice; in contrast, loss aversion amplifies the effect of price differences, accelerating the switch to informal recyclers. Finally, the loss aversion of informal recyclers intensifies their oscillation and uncertainty between “cooperation” and “counteraction.” With increasing loss aversion, their evolutionary trajectories display stronger fluctuations and greater instability.