撤销
可验证秘密共享
计算机安全
问责
计算机科学
钥匙(锁)
访问控制
密文
云计算
公钥密码术
方案(数学)
授权
加密
密钥管理
基于属性的加密
互联网隐私
公钥基础设施
数据共享
吊销列表
计算机网络
信息隐私
遮罩(插图)
密码学
业务
数据完整性
语义安全
作者
Noshaba Naeem,Mohsen Toorani
出处
期刊:Cryptography
[Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute]
日期:2026-08-18
卷期号:10 (4): 59-59
被引量:1
标识
DOI:10.3390/cryptography10040059
摘要
In regulated cross-institution electronic health record (EHR) sharing, access control may need to respect patient consent while also providing issuance accountability and revocation correctness. Existing multi-authority ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (MA-CP-ABE) schemes provide decentralized attribute management but generally do not bind key issuance and ciphertext use to explicit patient-authorized sharing episodes, nor do they provide proactive verification that accepted key packages are consistent with authenticated user requests and the current revocation state. In this paper, we propose a verifiable, consent-bound MA-CP-ABE scheme for cloud-assisted EHR sharing. The scheme binds ciphertexts and attribute key packages issued to a patient-signed consent identifier, supports request-consistent and verifiable key issuance, integrates revocation freshness and stale-key detection, and provides a two-layer accountability framework consisting of proactive issuance verification together with reactive tracing and audit. In addition, each issued package is bound to the enrolled user public key and to a user-originated commitment, supporting restricted designated-user delivery. Theoretical and experimental evaluations indicate that, under the stated trust and non-collusion assumptions, the proposed design strengthens consent-scoped access control and accountability while maintaining competitive computational efficiency for cloud-based EHR systems.
科研通智能强力驱动
Strongly Powered by AbleSci AI