计算机科学
可扩展性
斯塔克伯格竞赛
数据聚合器
软件部署
对手
稳健性(进化)
信息隐私
原始数据
计算机安全
服务器
数据共享
节点(物理)
车载自组网
差别隐私
计算机网络
过程(计算)
数据存取
利用
集合(抽象数据类型)
对手模型
数据建模
大数据
数据收集
无线传感器网络
参与式感知
消费者隐私
路径(计算)
拥挤感测
建筑
作者
Yousef AlSaqabi,Yinan Zhou,Faisal Nawab,Bhaskar Krishnamachari
标识
DOI:10.1109/tiv.2026.3750595
摘要
We present a novel game-theoretic framework designed to enhance privacy and scalability in decentralized vehicular data collection systems. The proposed hybrid architecture comprises vehicles that supply sensor data, independent servers that process data via secure multiparty computation, a coordinator node that manages data flow, and data consumers that set economic incentives. Crucially, our framework ensures that only the data consumer can access the fully aggregated data, preventing individual raw data exposure and significantly reducing privacy risks. By integrating principles of the Stackelberg competition from game theory, our approach dynamically balances privacy and economic incentives, enabling vehicles to make participation decisions based on perceived privacy risks and incentives. We empirically validate our framework using real-world vehicular location data, quantifying privacy risks by evaluating the accuracy with which a potential adversary can reconstruct a vehicle's path using only a subset of the shared data. This paper details the development and deployment of a data-trading platform within this framework, introducing a practical and privacy-preserving marketplace for profitable vehicle data sharing. Through experiments and simulations, we evaluate the effectiveness of the system in preserving privacy and explore the dynamics that influence vehicle participation. Our findings highlight the robustness of the proposed framework in preserving privacy while supporting an active data market.
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