补贴
供应链
业务
利润(经济学)
纳什均衡
微观经济学
产品(数学)
产业组织
干预(咨询)
社会福利
经济
经济干预主义
竞赛(生物学)
营销
市场经济
法学
政治
精神科
生物
数学
生态学
政治学
心理学
几何学
作者
Jiuh‐Biing Sheu,Yenming J. Chen
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.ijpe.2012.03.024
摘要
Abstract This work analyzes the effects of governmental financial intervention on green supply chain competition using a three-stage game-theoretic model. Nash equilibrium solutions for governmental and chain member decisions are derived. Analytical results suggest that the government should adopt green taxation and subsidization to ensure that green profit attributed to green-product production is non-negative. Strategically, low-wholesale-price strategies are suggested to recycled-component suppliers under green subsidization to stimulate manufacturers' intention of green product production under green taxation. Numerical results reveal that under equilibrium conditions, social welfare and chain-based profits improve by 27.8% and 306.6%, respectively, compared with the case without financial intervention.
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