激励
利益相关者
复制因子方程
政府(语言学)
信息隐私
博弈论
设计隐私
隐私政策
系统动力学
进化稳定策略
业务
计算机科学
纳什均衡
知识管理
隐私软件
多样性(控制论)
进化动力学
序贯博弈
进化博弈论
风险分析(工程)
管理科学
互联网隐私
理论(学习稳定性)
作者
Shuai Deng,Huang Yanling,Yao Lan
出处
期刊:SAGE Open
[SAGE Publishing]
日期:2026-10-01
卷期号:16 (4)
标识
DOI:10.1177/21582440261506713
摘要
To enhance privacy protection strategies in libraries-based Artificial Intelligence Generated Content (AIGC) technologies, this study investigates the interactive decision-making among government, libraries, and users. Based on evolutionary game theory, a three-party evolutionary game (TEG) model is constructed to analyze their strategic interactions. Replicator dynamic equations are applied to identify the drivers of strategy changes and the equilibrium stability conditions, while system dynamics simulations using Vensim PLE 7.5b explore parameter settings under which different equilibria emerge. The analysis further examines the sensitivity of stakeholder behaviors to incentive mechanisms. Results show that government reputation, libraries optimization costs and risks, and user disclosure incentives and privacy concerns are the critical factors shaping strategic choices. Accordingly, the study suggests that governments should strengthen the assessment of privacy protection performance to safe-guard reputation, libraries should reduce optimization costs through technological innovation, and users should enhance their awareness of privacy risks. Moreover, the findings emphasize the importance of incentive mechanisms, recommending that policymakers adopt moderate penalties and rewards to effectively promote privacy protection. In conclusion, this study has expanded our understanding of the AIGC privacy issues in libraries, and has also provided a theoretical basis and operational guidelines for the design of library privacy protection policies.
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