备份
违反直觉
弹性(材料科学)
业务
稳健性(进化)
利润(经济学)
供应链
计算机科学
运筹学
风险分析(工程)
外包
福利
环境经济学
社会福利
运营管理
微观经济学
情景分析
消费者福利
方案规划
报童模式
心理弹性
产业组织
作者
Yizhen Lu,Jianqiang Zhang
摘要
Abstract Geopolitically driven disruptions have become increasingly frequent, posing risks to global supply chains. To investigate firms' disruption mitigation strategies and their interactions, we develop a two‐period game‐theoretic model in which the pre‐disruption and post‐disruption periods are explicitly separated. Within this framework, we analyze the manufacturer's optimal inventory and backup sourcing decisions and their impact on the primary supplier. The analysis gives several counterintuitive insights. First, an increase in the disruption probability can improve the manufacturer's profit under certain conditions. Second, contracting with a backup supplier is not always optimal; in some cases, relying solely on inventory yields higher profit. Third, the introduction of a backup supplier may generate a win‐win‐win outcome for the manufacturer, the primary supplier, and the backup supplier. We further show that contracting a backup supplier improves consumer surplus and social welfare when the inventory holding cost is low, but may reduce them when it is high. Several model extensions confirm the qualitative robustness of our main insights.
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