透明度(行为)
业务
产业组织
微观经济学
经济
计算机科学
计算机安全
作者
Jiayi Joey Yu,Musen Kingsley Li,Wei Shi Lim,Christopher S. Tang
标识
DOI:10.1080/00207543.2025.2522858
摘要
To create differentiating value for socially conscious consumers, a new entrant may (or may not) reveal its true cost to consumers when entering a market. In response to this potential threat, should an existing incumbent operating under cost opacity set a sufficiently low price to deter the entrant from entering the market? We examine these questions in both monopolistic and duopolistic settings. In a monopolistic setting (when there is no incumbent), we find that the entrant should adopt cost transparency only when its true cost is sufficiently high or when its true cost is not high but consumers highly value cost transparency. We also explore a duopolistic setting in which a pre-existing incumbent firm is committed not to disclosing its true cost, and we examine if and when the incumbent firm should deter the entry of the new firm by setting a sufficiently low price. In traditional settings, the incumbent and the entrant compete solely on price without differentiation, making coexistence impossible. Hence, the incumbent either deters the entrant or exits the market. However, our model considers scenarios where consumers value fairness and transparency, and the incumbent has a reputation advantage. Consequently, as the entrant uses cost transparency to differentiate as an option to enter the market, competition is reduced, allowing the incumbent to tolerate the entrant without lowering its price or exiting the market. Therefore, our findings provide valuable insights for entrant firms on when to adopt cost transparency, and for incumbent firms on if and when to deter new competitors.
科研通智能强力驱动
Strongly Powered by AbleSci AI