竞争
企业风险投资
竞争优势
业务
产业组织
风险投资
投资(军事)
声誉
营销
经济
财务
微观经济学
社会科学
社会学
政治
政治学
法学
作者
Tianxu Chen,Jianhong Chen,Danny Miller,Isabelle Le Breton–Miller,Ming‐Jer Chen
摘要
Abstract Research Summary This study views corporate venture capital (CVC) investment as a form of inter‐firm rivalry. Adopting a competitive dynamics perspective, we argue that when a focal corporate investor invests in an entrepreneurial venture, that investment sends important competitive signals to its rivals, thereby increasing their likelihood of initiating a matching response. We theorize how three factors characterizing such investment—the amount of funding, industry relatedness between the corporate investor and the entrepreneurial venture, and the reputation of the corporate investor—can influence rivals' awareness of competitive threat, their motivation to respond, and therefore their likelihood of launching a matching counterattack. Our results demonstrate substantial support for our theoretical model. Managerial Summary This study views CVC investment as a form of competitive interaction, arguing that when a corporate investor participates in an investment round, it sends a competitive signal to its rival, motivating the latter to respond by also investing in CVC. Because of this counteraction, the competitive advantages of firms' CVC strategies may be temporary as rivals catch up and nullify the benefits of a CVC initiative. Thus, when planning strategy, CVC managers need to take potential rival counteractions into account and carefully assess the competitive implications of their CVC strategy, perhaps by avoiding harmful counteractions through initiatives more subtle in execution and orientation, and thus “under the radar” of rivals.
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