中国
权力下放
谈判
威权主义
经济体制
机构
公司治理
减贫
政府(语言学)
经济
经济改革
发展经济学
贫穷
政治学
业务
经济政策
市场经济
经济增长
民主
法学
语言学
哲学
财务
政治
标识
DOI:10.1257/jel.49.4.1076
摘要
China's economic reforms have resulted in spectacular growth and poverty reduction. However, China's institutions look ill-suited to achieve such a result, and they indeed suffer from serious shortcomings. To solve the “China puzzle,” this paper analyzes China's institution—a regionally decentralized authoritarian system. The central government has control over personnel, whereas subnational governments run the bulk of the economy; and they initiate, negotiate, implement, divert, and resist reforms, policies, rules, and laws. China's reform trajectories have been shaped by regional decentralization. Spectacular performance on the one hand and grave problems on the other hand are all determined by this governance structure. (JEL O17, O18, O43, P21, P25, P26)
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