外包
产业组织
业务
利润(经济学)
古诺竞争
采购
竞争对手分析
经济盈余
激励
微观经济学
稳健性(进化)
纵向一体化
竞赛(生物学)
社会福利
市场份额
双头垄断
供应链
福利
经济
完全竞争
市场结构
商业
合作请愿
产品(数学)
竞争优势
知识流程外包
高效能源利用
新产品开发
产品差异化
竞争模式
作者
Beile Feng,Wentao Zhan,Chencan Lin,Peilun Sun,Yitong Zhao,Minghui Jiang
出处
期刊:Systems
[Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute]
日期:2026-08-21
卷期号:14 (8): 1034-1034
标识
DOI:10.3390/systems14081034
摘要
Amid increasing upstream raw-material disruptions and battery supply uncertainty, NEV manufacturers may obtain emergency supply from vertically integrated competitors after a disruption, but must incur technology conversion costs. We develop a differentiated Cournot duopoly model with an outsourcing manufacturer and an integrated manufacturer to compare equilibrium, profit, and welfare outcomes with and without emergency procurement cooperation. The results show that cooperation has a clear feasibility boundary jointly determined by market potential, relative costs, and conversion costs, giving rise to competition-only, cooperation-only, and coopetition regimes. The cooperation option reshapes pre-disruption quantity decisions: the outsourcing manufacturer increases regular procurement, while the integrated manufacturer reduces its own-brand output by a larger amount. Within the cooperation region, higher conversion costs continuously reduce the outsourcing manufacturer’s profit, whereas the integrated manufacturer’s profit can be U-shaped. Greater product substitutability makes cooperation more fragile and widens the divergence between private profit incentives and supply-chain resilience. Consumer surplus and social welfare may also move in different directions, depending on the outsourcing manufacturer’s benchmark market share and conversion cost. A Nash-bargaining extension confirms the robustness of the activation condition and pre-disruption quantity-adjustment mechanism, while reducing emergency markups and improving consumer surplus.
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