斯塔克伯格竞赛
偏移量(计算机科学)
机制(生物学)
计算机科学
数学优化
工艺工程
工程类
经济
数理经济学
数学
物理
量子力学
程序设计语言
作者
Hui Hou,Xiangdi Ge,Yulin Yan,Yinghua Lu,Zhang Ji,Dong Zhang
出处
期刊:Energy
[Elsevier]
日期:2024-03-01
卷期号:: 130617-130617
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.energy.2024.130617
摘要
The low-carbon economic operation of integrated energy systems (IES) cannot be separated from the carbon trading and green certificate trading market. Therefore, a low-carbon market mechanism and optimization method for IES is proposed. First, we establish a “green-carbon” offset mechanism to realize the conversion from tradable green certificate (TGC) to carbon quotas to offset system's carbon emissions. Second, considering the impact of market incentives and users' consumption behavior on IES, an energy management method of IES is put forward based on Stackelberg game. IES operators as leaders decide energy prices and trading strategies of carbon, TGC and multi-energy. Energy users as followers participate in the integrated demand response based on energy price. The game is solved by an improved adaptive catastrophic genetic algorithm and CPLEX solver. Finally, we take an industrial park in China as an example to analyze. The results show that the proposed method can significantly reduce the system's carbon emissions while improving the benefits for both IES and consumers.
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