可追溯性
供应链
块链
业务
市场细分
补贴
质量(理念)
仿制品
农业
商业
产业组织
营销
经济
计算机安全
计算机科学
市场经济
生态学
哲学
软件工程
认识论
政治学
法学
生物
作者
LI Chun-mei,Tianjian Yang,Ying Shi
出处
期刊:Mathematics
[Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute]
日期:2023-12-28
卷期号:12 (1): 106-106
被引量:2
摘要
The quality authenticity of organic agricultural products has always been a hot issue for consumers. Blockchain’s advantages in information traceability and preventing data from being tampered with can reduce fake and counterfeit products, increasing the consumers’ trust in the quality of organic agricultural products. Considering market segmentation of consumer types in organic agricultural products (OPs) and conventional agricultural products (CPs), this study builds a game-theoretical model to explore how participants decide between blockchain traceability platforms and organic subsidy strategies. Results show that the producer should introduce the blockchain when the fraction of blockchain technology’s total cost shared by the producer is smaller and the fixed cost of implementing blockchain is higher or when the fraction of blockchain technology’s total cost shared by the producer is higher and the fixed cost of implementing blockchain is lower. The retailer is inclined to an organic subsidy, and the smaller the market proportion of undifferentiated-conscious consumers (UCCs), the more inclined the retailer is to the organic subsidy strategy. In addition, the market share of UCCs positively promotes the sales quantities and supply chain profits of CPs but is not conducive to the sales quantities of OPs.
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