Democratization and International Border Agreements

Does the removal of salient external threats foster democratization? Recent research proposes an affirmative answer but either fails to examine democratization at the monadic level, to consider small-scale democratization, or to account for factors known to influence the democratization process. The current study addresses this deficit by (re)examining democratization during the period 1919–2006. The findings suggest a strong relationship between border settlement and democratization. A state that settles all of its interstate borders democratizes; any outstanding unsettled borders, however, prevent significant democratization. Furthermore, although border settlement contributes to democratization, it does not significantly affect democratic regime change. This empirical evidence cumulatively specifies a more precise relationship between external threat and democratization than previous work and thereby contributes directly to the recent debate between the territorial and democratic peace theories. It also suggests that democratization may proceed more readily if states address unsettled borders first.