The reflexive subject: Towards a theory of reflexivity as practical intelligibility

This article argues for a new perspective on the meaning and implications of reflexivity for understanding subjectivity. The two dominant perspectives on the genesis and consequences of reflexive subjectivities are discussed and critiqued in terms of the way they understand the relationship between reflexivity and the wider social world. Reflexive modernisation theory is critiqued for its empty and homogeneous view of reflexivity stemming ultimately from the absence of a theory of the subject. Critical realism is critiqued for its view of reflexivity as a disembodied rationality and its hostility to any connection between reflexivity and pre-reflexive foundations for identity. Drawing on the dialogue between these theories and practice theories, this article creates a new theory of reflexivity which overturns theoretical orthodoxies viewing reflexivity and social practice as opposed concepts. Based on insights from Bourdieu and other practice theorists, this article argues for a theory of reflexivity as actualising a practical intelligibility shaped by the dispositions of the habitus. Examples from empirical literature examining the relationship between reflexivity and class inequality support a theory of reflexive subjectivity based on principles of practice theory.