自愿披露
职责
会计
业务
全面披露
情感(语言学)
计算机科学
法学
政治学
心理学
计算机安全
沟通
作者
Anne Beyer,Ronald A. Dye
出处
期刊:Management Science
[Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences]
日期:2022-10-31
卷期号:69 (7): 4283-4311
被引量:5
标识
DOI:10.1287/mnsc.2022.4519
摘要
We develop a model of a manager’s equilibrium voluntary disclosure policy to study how that policy changes depending on whether the manager is prohibited from disclosing, or allowed to disclose, a half-truth; we also examine how the disclosure policy changes depending on whether the manager has a duty to update past disclosures. Among our results, we show that if a manager is prohibited from issuing half-truths, the manager discloses a wider array of information than if the manager is allowed to issue half-truths, and investors view the absence of disclosure more skeptically; we also show that imposing a duty to update on the manager does not affect the manager’s initial disclosures, but it results in the manager disclosing uniformly more information over time. This paper was accepted by Brian Bushee, accounting.
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