Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information

Journal Article Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information Get access Antoine Faure-Grimaud, Antoine Faure-Grimaud London School of Economics, Financial Markets Group and CEPR Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Jean-Jacques Laffont, Jean-Jacques Laffont Université de Toulouse (GREMAQ, IDEI) and University of South California Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar David Martimort David Martimort Université de Toulouse (GREMAQ, IDEI) Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 70, Issue 2, April 2003, Pages 253–279, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937X.000244 Published: 01 April 2003 Article history Received: 01 July 2000 Accepted: 01 April 2002 Published: 01 April 2003