Nuclear Coercion, Crisis Bargaining, and The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict of 1969

The claim that President Donald Trump's "fire and fury" pressure campaign coerced North Korea to return to the bargaining table has renewed debates about coercion among nuclear powers. This article contributes to these debates by refining our understanding of the 1969 Sino-Soviet border crisis. Drawing on Romanian archival documents and Chinese-language sources, this article challenges the assertion that Soviet nuclear threats coerced the Chinese to return to the bargaining table. Further, it explains China's otherwise puzzling intransigence when border negotiations resumed. After China's leaders agreed to return to the bargaining table, they became fearful of a Soviet nuclear attack and fled Beijing; despite this fear, however, the Chinese resisted a border deal for decades. Why did the fear of a Soviet nuclear attack fail to compel the Chinese to accept a border deal? By improving our understanding of the 1969 crisis, this article sheds new light on the conditions under which nuclear compellence succeeds.