Evolutionary game analysis on industrial pollution control of local government in China

The pollution control of local government to industrial enterprises is actually a long-term, complex and dynamic game process. This study develops an evolutionary game model to analyze the operation mechanism of local governments’ different expenditure preferences on the production behavior of industrial polluting enterprises, so as to specify the behavioral characteristics and optimal strategy of local environmental governance. The results indicated that whether the relationship between local governments and polluting enterprises in environmental governance becomes cooperative or collusive depends on their game sequence and initial endowment. Under the condition of realizing a steady state of cooperation, polluting enterprises would advance faster toward clean production if local governments distribute more environmental expenditures on cost subsidies for enterprises to implement clean production. The findings of this study provide decision-making basis for local governments to control industrial pollution. • Government environmental control is studied using an evolutionary game model. • The behavior and optimal strategies for environmental control are revealed. • The evolution result is influenced by the game order and initial endowment. • Realizing a steady state of cooperation requires an incentive mechanism.