原设备制造商
盈利能力指数
产业组织
业务
联营
生产(经济)
激励
产品(数学)
制造业
投资(军事)
商业
营销
经济
微观经济学
财务
计算机科学
几何学
数学
人工智能
政治
政治学
法学
操作系统
作者
Erica L. Plambeck,Terry A. Taylor
出处
期刊:Management Science
[Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences]
日期:2005-01-01
卷期号:51 (1): 133-150
被引量:258
标识
DOI:10.1287/mnsc.1040.0212
摘要
In the electronics industry and others, original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) are selling their production facilities to contract manufacturers (CMs). The CMs achieve high capacity utilization through pooling (supplying many different OEMs). Meanwhile, the OEMs focus on innovation: research and development, product design, and marketing. We examine how this change in industry structure affects investment in innovation and capacity, and thus profitability. In particular, innovation is noncontractible, so OEMs will invest less in innovation than is ideal for the industry as a whole. Hence, although contract manufacturing improves capacity utilization, it may reduce the profitability of the industry as a whole by weakening the incentives for innovation. Contract manufacturing is not the only means to achieve capacity pooling. Alternatively, the OEMs can pool capacity with one another through supply contracts or a joint venture. This may result in underinvestment or overinvestment in innovation and capacity, but always increases profitability. We find that the sale of production facilities to a CM improves profitability for the industry as a whole if and only if OEMs are subsequently in a strong bargaining position vis-à-vis the CM. If the OEMs are indeed very strong, the gain from pooling capacity via contract manufacturing is maximized in industries with moderate cost of capacity.
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