权力下放
激励
外包
分散系统
集合(抽象数据类型)
组分(热力学)
产品(数学)
帕累托原理
计算机科学
运筹学
供应链
微观经济学
数学优化
产业组织
业务
经济
控制(管理)
运营管理
数学
营销
人工智能
物理
热力学
市场经济
程序设计语言
几何学
作者
Fernando Bernstein,Gregory A. DeCroix,Yulan Wang
出处
期刊:Operations Research
[Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences]
日期:2007-08-01
卷期号:55 (4): 630-646
被引量:47
标识
DOI:10.1287/opre.1070.0402
摘要
In this paper, we explore the impact of decentralized decision making on the behavior of multiproduct assembly systems. Specifically, we consider a system where three components (two product specific and one common) are used to produce two end products to satisfy stochastic customer demands. We study the system under both centralized and decentralized decision making. In the decentralized system, we prove that for any set of wholesale prices, there exists a unique Pareto-optimal equilibrium in the suppliers’ capacity game. We show that the assembler’s optimal wholesale prices lie in one of two regions—one leads to capacity imbalance and one does not. We use these results to derive insights regarding the inefficiencies that decentralization can cause in such systems. In particular, several of our findings indicate that outsourcing the management of component supplies may inhibit the use of operational hedging approaches for managing uncertainty.
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