商誉
利用
估值效应
审计
估价(财务)
经验证据
经济
市场价值
价值(数学)
企业价值
债务
资本资产定价模型
业务
精算学
资产(计算机安全)
货币经济学
同侪效应
投资(军事)
金融经济学
股东
账面价值
脆弱性(计算)
公司财务
会计
苦恼
计量经济学
实证检验
面板数据
系统性风险
衡平法
微观经济学
实证研究
公司控制权市场
作者
Yi Jiang,Yupeng Lin,Wenjie Xue
标识
DOI:10.2308/tar-2022-0526
摘要
We study the effect of subsequent write-off tests on myopic managers’ investment decisions. Write-off tests discipline overinvestment when the likelihood of adverse events is high but can otherwise cause more severe underinvestment. Hence, tightening impairment stringency improves firm value when the likelihood of adverse events is high but destroys firm value when that likelihood is low. With intermediate levels of likelihood, firm value is hump-shaped in impairment stringency. To test the theory, we exploit an increase in goodwill impairment stringency following goodwill-related restatements by peer firms audited by the same auditor office, and we adopt a stacked difference-in-differences (DiD) design to control for any generic effects of peer restatements. Firms facing more stringent goodwill impairment reduce M&As relative to other types of investment, as well as in absolute amounts. The valuation of treated firms improves only during periods of high recession expectations or when facing high distress risk. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the text. JEL Classifications: D82; G31; G34; M41; M42.
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