联盟
独创性
谈判
激励
业务
项目管理
综合项目交付
工作(物理)
过程管理
营销
知识管理
公共关系
计算机科学
社会学
定性研究
经济
管理
工程类
微观经济学
法学
社会科学
机械工程
政治学
作者
Albertus Laan,Hans Voordijk,Geert P.M.R. Dewulf
出处
期刊:International Journal of Managing Projects in Business
[Emerald Publishing Limited]
日期:2011-09-13
卷期号:4 (4): 660-679
被引量:96
标识
DOI:10.1108/17538371111164065
摘要
Purpose The purpose of this paper is to provide insights into how a project alliance contract is conducive to the development of cooperative relationships between client and contractor organizations involved in a complex project. Design/methodology/approach A longitudinal case study of a complex construction project was conducted in which the contract was changed at the end of the negotiation period from a design‐build into a project alliance form. Findings Data show that opportunistic behaviour is reduced when there is an incentive structure, as is to be found in project alliances, for client and contractor organizations to cooperatively realize the project. However, it is not sufficient for project partners to agree upon an appropriate incentive structure. For cooperative relationships to develop, they also have to put substantial efforts into reducing their remaining inclinations to make use of opportunities that arise to deviate from the alliance contract. Practical implications It is shown that both principals and contractors not only need to carefully select staff for such projects; they also have to work with the people employed such that appropriate attitudes are reinforced and rewarded. Developing cooperative relationships in project alliances needs the surrounding working methods to offer support. Originality/value The longitudinal character of the case study offers exceptional opportunities for studying the dynamics in preventing and overcoming the deteriorating patterns of opportunistic behaviour that organizations regularly face in many traditional and design‐build projects.
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