斯塔克伯格竞赛
计算机科学
MNIST数据库
激励
趋同(经济学)
方案(数学)
公制(单位)
GSM演进的增强数据速率
声誉
人工智能
机器学习
深度学习
工程类
数理经济学
运营管理
数学
社会科学
微观经济学
经济
社会学
数学分析
经济增长
作者
Zhaohua Zheng,Yiming Hong,Xin Xie,Keqiu Li,Qiquan Chen
摘要
Abstract Federated learning represents a decentralized approach to machine learning, enabling numerous devices to collaboratively contribute to model training while ensuring the privacy of individual data. However, the existing incentive mechanism of hierarchical federated learning (HFL) only considers the data contribution of a single round, which needs to be revised. For non‐IID data sets, the continuous selection of any end devices will cause the weights to diverge in a specific direction. Therefore, a new metric is needed to avoid continuously selecting a certain end device to ensure the overall effectiveness. We introduce a metric to describe the importance of updates: age of update (AoU), which can help select end devices not selected in the previous round to promote a faster model convergence. We put forward an incentive mechanism based on AoU, reputation, and data quantity in HFL (ARDHFL). We have derived the optimal equilibrium solution for the three‐stage Stackelberg game. Based on this solution, we can ensure maximum edge‐cloud utility while incentivizing end devices to engage actively in HFL tasks and providing superior data to train the HFL model. Finally, we conducted extensive experiments to prove that ARDHFL can effectively improve the performance. Compared with the fixed scheme, random scheme, FMore and InFEDge, the testing accuracy of ARDHFL in the MNIST dataset has been improved by 29.7%, 9.3%, 6.8% and 6.1%, respectively. In the CIFAR‐10 dataset, it has been improved by 40.2%, 33.1%, 16.4% and 14.2%, respectively, and demands fewer communication iterations to achieve the same testing accuracy.
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