The influences of interlocking director network on voluntary supply chain disclosure

Purpose Interlocking director networks facilitate the exchange of information and resource sharing among firms. As a result, firms within these networks often imitate and learn from each other’s behaviors, which can influence their decisions regarding supply chain disclosure. Therefore, guided by social network theory, this study investigates how interlocking director network characteristics – specifically centrality and structural holes – influence firms’ voluntary supply chain disclosure decisions. Design/methodology/approach Using data from A-share firms listed on China’s Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2013 to 2022, the relationship between interlocking director networks and both voluntary supplier and customer disclosure is empirically examined. A two-way fixed effects model incorporating negative binomial regression is employed. Findings The results suggest that firms with higher centrality and greater access to structural holes within interlocking director networks are more willing to voluntarily disclose supply chain information. Further analysis reveals that this positive effect is moderated by firm external environments, including industry competition and business environment. Originality/value This study enriches the literature on voluntary disclosure and provides a reference for managers to improve voluntary supply chain disclosure by exploiting interlocking director network.