斯塔克伯格竞赛
计算机科学
数学优化
博弈论
能源消耗
环境经济学
能量(信号处理)
收入
还原(数学)
模拟
传输(电信)
功率(物理)
重复博弈
电力系统
风力发电
非合作博弈
碳纤维
能量流
推进
发电
高效能源利用
随机博弈
最优化问题
虚拟发电厂
纳什均衡
能源管理
温室气体
运筹学
作者
Xu Wei,Yufeng Guo,Yifei Liu,Xuechen Bai
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.ecmx.2025.101427
摘要
To advance sustainable energy management in Park Integrated Energy Systems (PIESs), this paper proposes a hybrid game model among multiple PIESs to reduce carbon emissions under carbon emission quota (CEQ) policies. We introduce a virtual energy flow-based carbon emission optimization (VEF-CEO) method, where the virtual energy flow refers to an energy allocation determined by trading contracts rather than physical transmission paths. This approach linearizes emission calculations and resolves locational carbon price disparities. Within PIES, a Stackelberg game model transfers CEQ assessment costs to the load side, clarifying carbon reduction responsibilities and enhancing collaborative effects. Among PIESs, a cooperative game model improves CEQ satisfaction and economic benefits through coordination. The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions transform the Stackelberg model into a single-level model, and the Augmented Lagrange based Alternating Direction Inexact Newton (ALADIN) method is employed for non-convex model distributed solving. Case study demonstrates that cooperative strategies increase revenues by 21.4% and 51.3% for two PIESs respectively, and achieve complete wind power accommodation. The Stackelberg game successfully steers user consumption via price signals, and the VEF-CEO method outperforms traditional methods in fairness and computational efficiency. These findings validate the effectiveness of hybrid game approach, VEF-CEO method, and ALADIN algorithm for PIES optimization.
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