Objectivism

In Chapter 2, I discuss theories of objectivism, or the requirement that all genuine knowledge be observer-independent and/or neutral. I provide a brief outline of objectivist accounts and distinguish these from objectivity. Drawing on historical analyses, I show how objectivity in science refers to a set of practices aimed at reducing variability in the recording and transmission of observations, but that objectivism is an overgeneralization of these practices into an incoherent epistemological mandate. I argue that objectivism is illusory, both because knowledge can never be produced independent of a historically situated knower and also because neither individuals nor human systems can be neutral. Objectivism, I claim, can only be performative and so serves as a cover for, rather than a defense against, institutionalized forms of privilege. Objectivist practices also dehumanize the subjects of scientific labor and so anesthetize the moral responsiveness of those who produce and consume research.