The purpose of this essay is to explore whether or not military deception can aid the work with “Hearts and Minds”. The theory that already exist do not deal with the incorporation of how the work with “Hearts and Minds” should be done with regards to military deception. Theorys for counterinsurgency and military deception are described in order to explore whether deception could be used usefully within a “Hearts and Minds”-operation. The study analyzes the executed deception found in the conflicts in Northern Ireland, Algeria and Malaysia, 1954-1962 1948-1960, to show the cases of military deception within the insurrectionperformed by the counterinsurgent. The conclusions of the thesis shows that deception is unlikely to help work on Hearts and Minds in a successful manner. However, deception may create conditions for Hearts and Minds operations if it is possible to ensure that the effect of deception is isolated to the rebels and not to the people.