The Capability Approach: a theoretical survey

Abstract This paper aims to present a theoretical survey of the capability approach in an interdisciplinary and accessible way. It focuses on the main conceptual and theoretical aspects of the capability approach, as developed by Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum, and others. The capability approach is a broad normative framework for the evaluation and assessment of individual well‐being and social arrangements, the design of policies, and proposals about social change in society. Its main characteristics are its highly interdisciplinary character, and the focus on the plural or multidimensional aspects of well‐being. The approach highlights the difference between means and ends, and between substantive freedoms (capabilities) and outcomes (achieved functionings). Keywords: Amartya SenCapabilitiesCapability approachDevelopmentFunctioningsJusticeMartha NussbaumPovertyWell‐being Notes For more bibliographical references then those provided in the text and footnotes, see online (www.capabilityapproach.org). It is impossible to address all theoretical and conceptual questions related to the capability approach in the space of one article. Some other key issues not discussed in this survey are the precise nature of the concept of freedom in Sen's capability approach (Cohen, 1993; Pettit, 2001; Olsaretti, forthcoming), and the question whether the capability approach is sufficiently critical and able to provide a radical critique of power relations in society (Hill, 2003; Koggel, 2003; Robeyns, 2003b), among others. For a discussion of the different strands of liberal political philosophy, see Nussbaum (1999), Swift (2001) and Kymlicka (2002). More precisely, the capability approach asks whether people have the substantive opportunity to be healthy and well‐nourished. At the individual level there may always be individuals who have the effective opportunity to be healthy and well‐nourished but opt not to be so; for example, if they fast or are on a hunger strike. For large numbers, however, we can safely assume that virtually all people who have the capability of being healthy and well‐nourished, would also opt to effectively be so. See also Crocker (2004) and Gasper (2004, chapter 7). See Pogge (2002) for ethical individualism in theories of justice, and Robeyns (2003b) for a further defence of ethical individualism in the capability approach.