块链
仿制品
业务
供应链
收入
斯塔克伯格竞赛
杠杆(统计)
收入分享
质量(理念)
产品(数学)
利润(经济学)
商业
产业组织
声誉
经济盈余
微观经济学
微观数据(统计)
定价策略
博弈论
先发优势
营销
作弊
互补性商品
供应链管理
可追溯性
供求关系
净利润
作者
Liuxin Zou,Han Gao,Jiang Wu,Mingyang Chen
标识
DOI:10.1080/00207543.2026.2734205
摘要
Traditional anti-counterfeiting technologies are susceptible to replication and offer limited effectiveness, prompting interest in blockchain as a tamper-resistant alternative. This study develops four Stackelberg game models that incorporate two contractual mechanisms (wholesale price vs. revenue sharing) and two anti-counterfeiting strategies (with vs. without blockchain) to examine how blockchain combats counterfeiting through quality information disclosure. The results indicate that when blockchain adoption costs are low, blockchain implementation reduces prices, shifts novice consumers towards genuine products, and decreases the demand for counterfeit products. With a large proportion of novices and a low blockchain adoption cost, blockchain increases the profits of the manufacturer and the retailer while reducing the counterfeiter’s profit under certain conditions. Compared to wholesale price contracts, revenue sharing contracts better coordinate the supply chain and leverage the manufacturer’s pioneer advantage, resulting in higher manufacturer profits but lower profits for the retailer and the counterfeiter. Moreover, blockchain improves consumer surplus and social welfare, especially with a high proportion of novices or low prior probability of novices. Managerially, blockchain adoption should consider contract types, the proportion of novices, and their prior probabilities of the product being genuine. The genuine supply chain should adopt blockchain primarily for newly launched rather than established products.
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