学位(音乐)
竞赛(生物学)
计量经济学
经济
微观经济学
计算机科学
定价策略
数学优化
时间价值
补贴
价值(数学)
度量(数据仓库)
部分平衡
离散选择
网络模型
非线性定价
比较静力学
网络分析
动态定价
网络效应
网络规划与设计
电信网络
网络结构
交通网络
作者
Jiemin Zhang,Shulin Liu
出处
期刊:Mathematics
[Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute]
日期:2026-09-08
卷期号:14 (18): 3258-3258
摘要
This paper examines how the degree of double-counting network effects (w) affects platform interior pricing mechanisms under bilateral partial multi-homing. A major result in the study of two-sided platforms is that platforms do not provide subsidies under the assumption of multi-homing without double-counting network effects on both sides. Addressing this benchmark, this study constructs a bilateral platform competition model based on the Hotelling framework that incorporates double-counting network effects (w ≠ 0) to analyze the interior equilibrium of two-sided competition and pricing strategies systematically. The findings reveal that the candidate stationary prices on one side become negative for sufficiently strong cross-side network effects. Comparative static analyses demonstrate that candidate user participation under bilateral partial multi-homing is positively correlated with network effects and stand-alone intrinsic value and negatively correlated with transportation costs. Numerical simulations further reveal the existence of non-monotonic interior equilibrium patterns in which the degree of double-counting network effects influences candidate user participation, interior stationary pricing, and optimal platform profit. It is contingent upon the relative magnitudes of the fundamental parameters of the two-sided market. This study not only delineates the boundaries of negative candidate stationary price under multi-homing, but also provides important practical insights for managers formulating digital platform pricing strategies.
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