补贴
政府(语言学)
环境经济学
激励
博弈论
帕累托原理
收入
斯塔克伯格竞赛
微分博弈
废物回收
资源(消歧)
最大化
产业组织
经济
业务
微观经济学
工程类
运营管理
废物管理
计算机科学
数学优化
计算机网络
语言学
哲学
数学
会计
市场经济
作者
Jiahui Yang,Ruyin Long,Hong Chen,Qingqing Sun
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.resconrec.2021.105449
摘要
Waste recycling is a globally significant issue that can alleviate environmental pollution and resource shortages. However, due to the lack of effective incentive measures and recycling models, the recycling rate is low in China. Analyzing the behavior choices of relevant stakeholders and comparing the effective of different recycling models has become a practical problem. A multi-agent express packaging waste recycling system that includes governments, individuals and enterprises was constructed. Further, based on the differential game theory, this study explores the behavioral characteristics of individuals, optimal strategies of government and enterprises under market-driven recycling model, government-driven recycling model, and cooperation-driven recycling models. The analysis derives the following findings. (1) Under the market-driven recycling model and government-driven recycling model, both the government and enterprise take the maximization of their own interests as behavior principle, whereas under the cooperation-driven recycling model, they are both more concerned about improved benefits. (2) Compared with the market-driven recycling model, the government-driven recycling model has achieved Pareto improvement. (3) The cooperation-driven recycling model has the highest revenue. (4) Subsidies are conducive to improving the optimal effort levels of enterprises. This study can provide new ideas for related research and offer a theoretical basis to formulate efficient recycling policy.
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