Policy Instruments, Administrative Burdens, and Coproduction Preferences: Experimental Evidence From Household Waste Sorting

ABSTRACT Despite extensive research on individual‐ and organizational‐level determinants of coproduction preferences, empirical evidence regarding the role of policy design remains limited. This study develops a theoretical framework to examine how different policy instruments shape individuals' willingness to coproduce public services by influencing perceived administrative burdens. Using a conjoint experiment conducted with a nationally representative sample in China, we investigate the distinct effects of multiple policy instruments—namely regulatory mandates (“sticks”), economic incentives (“carrots”), informational campaigns (“sermons”), and behavioral interventions (“nudges”)—on individuals' perceptions of learning, psychological, and compliance costs. Our findings indicate that these policy instruments significantly and differentially affect perceived administrative burdens, which in turn substantially reduce respondents' willingness to participate in household waste sorting. This research contributes to the literature on policy design and individual‐state interactions by highlighting administrative burdens as a critical mediating mechanism linking policy instruments to coproduction participation. Practically, it provides valuable insights for policymakers and practitioners aiming to enhance public service coproduction through informed policy design.